In the ongoing battle against climate change, courts play a crucial role in holding governments accountable for their environmental commitments. Two significant cases, heard by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), highlight the contrasting approaches these courts take regarding the admissibility and locus standi of private applicants in climate litigation. Let’s dive into the Klimaseniorinnen case in Strasbourg and the Carvalho case in Luxembourg to see how each court handles these critical issues.

The ECtHR’s climate cases, including Klimaseniorinnen, have garnered significant public attention. Scholars and activists eagerly awaited the court’s decisions on April 9, 2024, a date marked on many calendars as a potential turning point in climate litigation. This attention was further amplified by the ECtHR’s decision to address three major climate cases on the same day, underscoring the urgency and importance of the climate crisis.

In contrast, the CJEU’s handling of the Carvalho case was markedly low-key. Delivered on March 25, 2021, the ruling dismissed the case for lack of standing without the fanfare or detailed examination seen in the ECtHR’s approach. The Carvalho ruling, a mere 17 pages long, was a stark reminder of the CJEU’s conservative stance on locus standi, remaining accessible only in English and French on the CURIA database.

The crux of legal standing in these cases reveals a stark divide between the two courts. The CJEU’s strict interpretation, based on the Plaumann test, requires private applicants to demonstrate they are “individually concerned” by a contested measure. This narrow interpretation, applied in the Carvalho case, sets a high bar for climate litigation. The court argued that recognizing standing based on the general impact of climate change would render Article 263(4) TFEU meaningless, effectively barring direct access to justice for most climate-related cases.

On the other hand, the ECtHR embraces an evolving interpretation of “victim status” to accommodate the unique aspects of climate change. In the Klimaseniorinnen case, the court developed specific criteria to assess victim status, focusing on the severity of climate change impacts on individuals and the pressing need for their protection. This adaptive approach contrasts sharply with the CJEU’s rigid stance.

Associations and NGOs also face differing fortunes in these courts. The CJEU’s stringent requirements effectively exclude many NGOs and associations from climate litigation, limiting the ability of collective bodies to advocate for broader environmental and human rights protections. In contrast, the ECtHR recognizes the vital role of associations and NGOs in representing collective interests. The court established criteria for their standing based on factors such as the organization’s purpose, activities, membership, and governance. This inclusive approach allows more voices to be heard in the fight against climate change.

The diverging approaches of the ECtHR and the CJEU in climate litigation underscore a broader philosophical divide. The ECtHR’s adaptive and dynamic method reflects a willingness to evolve with societal changes, providing broader access to justice in climate cases. Meanwhile, the CJEU’s static and conservative approach, grounded in the Plaumann test, maintains a high barrier for private applicants seeking redress.

Understanding these differences is crucial for anyone involved in climate litigation or environmental advocacy. As procedural and legal landscapes continue to evolve, further research will be essential to navigate the complexities of accessing justice in the fight against climate change.

In the end, the path each court takes will significantly shape the future of environmental law and the protection of human rights in the context of our planet’s most pressing challenge.